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Abstract: The main objective of this study is to empirically investigate whether the audit committee (AC) characteristics
are associated with earnings management (EM) of listed companies on the GCC countries as emerging markets. To
achieve the study’s objectives, 532 firm-year observations were used during the period from 2017-2020. A discretionary
accrual (DACC), a proxy for EM, was estimated according to the modified Jones’ model. EM/DACC as a dependent
variable was regressed with four independent variables, comprising the AC characteristics, namely AC size, AC
independence, AC financial expertise, and AC frequent meetings. Some more control variables were added to the
regression model. The study findings reveal that the level of EM on the study sample averaged 14.3% upward, which
suggests that the corporate governance code could have reduced the EM practices, but it hasn’t prevented it. Also, the
results show that EM is negatively and significantly associated with AC independence, AC financial expertise, and AC
number of meetings. Moreover, EM is not significantly associated with AC size. The conclusion of this study emphasizes
the monitoring role of AC on restricting EM. The findings of this study have wide implications to all stakeholders and
stock markets for the role of AC characteristics as internal corporate governance mechanism on restricting EM practices.
Keywords: Audit Committee Characteristics, Earnings Management, GCC Stock Markets.

1 Introduction
Earnings management (EM) can be defined as a purposeful
intervention in financial reporting, designed to reach
earnings targets by varying accounting practices (Callao,
and Wroblewski, 2014b). It could occur without violating
accounting regulations, as it takes advantage of the
possibilities of choice in accounting policy. EM can
mislead stakeholders, cause them to make decisions based
on the financial reports that are not free from EM.
According to the accounting literature, several motivations
were found for practicing EM such as market expectation,
contractual incentives, political incentives, and company’s
specific situation incentives (Callao, S., 2021). EM has
enormous impact on accounting and auditing professions in
general and on all corporations and their stakeholders in
specific. Several companies such as Enron, Parmalat, Tyco,
WorldCom, and Xerox are examples of scandals related to
EM that take place in the United States and Europe at the
end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first
century (Kwarbai and Osho, 2021). EM is likely to
influence the consistency of reported earnings and the
*Corresponding

usefulness of those earnings for making decisions. It lowers
the stakeholders’ confidence in financial statements.
The role of audit committee (AC) has increased in the last
few years, since it is an effective tool of corporate
governance, which could limit EM practices (Hamdan and
Mushtaha, 2011). According to professional bodies and
laws such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the USA’s SarbanesOxley law, and GCC corporate governance codes, a series
of quality characteristics are presented to have an active
AC. These qualities include AC size, AC financial
expertise, AC independence, and AC frequent meetings
(Activity). An active AC should have at least three
members, one of them has financial experience, one of
them is independent, and meet four times a year. AC can
handle all significant interactions with the independent
auditor, exchanges ideas and thoughts, serves as a mediator
between management, auditors, and board of director. It
plays a critical oversight role in ensuring the consistency of
financial reporting and corporate transparency (Carcello
and Neal, 2003; Bamahros and Bhasin, 2016). Agency
theory provides reasonable explanation for the role of AC
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in ensuring that managers behave in shareholders’ interest.
Therefore, companies set up audit committee to increase
the financial reporting quality (Saleh, et al., 2007; Ali, S.,
2021).
The previous literature on the association between audit
committee characteristics and earnings management have
various results. For instance, (Lin et al., 2006; Mishra &
Malhotra, 2016) reported negative association between AC
size and EM, while Abubakar, A. H., et al (2021) reported
positive correlation. Some other researchers reported
significant negative association between AC independence
and EM (Klein, 2002; Jerubet, et al., 2017), while other
researchers found significant positive association
(Supriyaningsih, S., and Fuad, F., 2017; Gao and Huang
2016; Akhor and Oseghale 2017). Baxter and Cotter (2009)
suggested that financial expertise on the AC reduces the
firm’s levels of EM. Similarly, Krishnan, G., and
Visvanathan, G. (2009) suggested that a bigger number of
financial experts on the AC improves monitoring function.
Examining the literature reveals that most of these studies
were conducted in developed countries, or conducted on
small sample, or included some of AC characteristics, and
no new study was conducted on the GCC context to have
reasonable sample and include all AC characteristics. This
study will fill the research gap by taking all these points
into consideration.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the
association between audit committee characteristics and
discretionary accruals (DACC) as proxy for earnings
management (EM) in the GCC context.
The contribution of the current study to existing literature is
to provide additional evidence about the associations
between AC characteristics and EM on the developing
countries, as well as provide evidence from emerging
markets in recent years, as the GCC context is a unique
business environment that provides a good opportunity and
offers a useful setting for investigating the relationship
between AC and EM.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section two includes the GCC countries context. Section
three presents the literature review and hypotheses
development. Section four explains the research
methodology. The findings and discussions are presented in
section five. Finally, section six summarizes the main
conclusions and implications.

2 The GCC Countries Context
GCC countries include six countries, sharing similar
political, cultural, language, characteristics and exhibit
similar financial and capital markets (Pillai & Al-Malkawi,
2018). The movement of GCC countries toward the
delegation of investment created the vital needs to have a
© 2022 NSP
Natural Sciences Publishing Cor.
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high-quality corporate governance. The GCC countries’
corporate governance codes and stock markets set some
regulations for creating AC, to comprise at least 3
members, majority of them independent, and minimum
number of meetings each year 4 times. In Saudi Arabia,
some regulations regarding AC were issued (Capital
Market Authority, Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006).
According to these regulations, AC duties are to analyse the
company's financial statements and ensure their integrity,
fairness, and transparency. In the United Arab Emirates, the
AC reviews the financial reports and audit policies and
regulations of the Public Joint Stock Companies (PJSC) and
works closely with the external auditor of these companies
to ensure that it carries out its engagement in accordance
with applicable law. The corporate governance codes in
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar are almost identical as
they stated same rules and duties for AC.
All GCC countries are applying IFRS standards In Bahrain
there is no local GAAP, and it has adopted IFRS Standards
for all companies (Article 219 of the Commercial
Companies Law). In Saudi Arabia, according to Saudi
Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA).
Applying IFRS are required for all listed companies starting
from January 1, 2017. In the United Arab Emirates, by law
(UAE Federal Law No. 2 of 2015), IFRS are required for
all listed companies to be applied from July 1, 2016. In
Kuwait, KAAA, as national professional accounting body,
requires all listed companies to mandatory apply IFRS. In
Oman, IFRS are required to be applied by all companies, as
they are endorsed by IASB without any amendment. In
Qatar, Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) has the
power to supervise and regulate the financial market (Law
No. (8) Of 2012). It requires all listed companies to apply
IFRS Standards. In summary, all GCC countries construct
similar corporate governance codes, including the job,
responsibility, and composition of ACs. Moreover, all these
countries are applying IFRS standards, which justified
combining them as one context.

3 Literature Review N and Hypothesis
Development:
This section pertains to reviewing the prior research
regarding the association between AC characteristics and
EM. Following the theory and literature, four
characteristics of AC are considered. These characteristics
have been seen as vital elements of the audit committee’s
overall effectiveness. So, this study we will focus on four
key characteristics including AC size, AC independence,
AC financial expertise, and AC frequent Meetings.

3.1 Audit Committee Size
The size of AC is known as the number of directors
selected to be members in the AC. According to the
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corporate governance code of GCC countries, the size of
AC should be at least three members. Prior research
suggested that size is an important characteristic of AC in
constraining the EM. Menon and Williams (1994) argued
that if the AC with less than three members is possible to be
ineffective. On the other hand, (Vafeas, N., 2005) argued
that large size could result in a weak performance because
of the coordination problems.
Prior research on the association between AC size and EM
provides indecisive results. Yang and Krishnan (2005)
reported negative association between AC size and EM on
the US companies. Similarly, Klein (2002) revealed that
EM is lower for companies with a larger AC size in
Australian companies. Lin et al., (2009) found that an AC
size is linked with lower levels of EM in Chinese
Companies. Some other research found positive association
between number of AC members and EM (Siregar and
Utama, 2008; Metawee, 2013). On the other hand, some
researchers found no association between AC size and EM
(Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Bedard et al., 2004).
Based on the above arguments, the association between AC
size and EM could be positive or negative or no
association, however, most studies reported negative
association and this study follows the literature so, the
following hypothesis could be formulated:
H1: There is a negative significant association between
audit committee size (ACSIZE) and earnings management
(EM).

3.2 Audit Committee Independence
The independence of AC can be defined as the extent to
which the AC is not under the pressure of management
(Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014). An independent
member can express an unbiased opinion than dependent
members. Moreover, the corporate governance codes and
stock markets regulations in GCC countries pay more
attention to the independence of AC members by
demanding the majority of members to be independent. It is
commonly known that an independent AC provides
effective monitoring of the financial reporting and ensures
the reliability of the financial statements. Prior literature on
the association between AC independence and EM offers
mixed results. For instance, Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003),
Davidson, et al. (2005), Lin and Hwang (2010) and
Soliman and Ragab (2014) reported negative association
between AC independence and EM practices. Abbott et al.,
(2004) found negative association between AC
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independence and financial reporting fraud and
misstatement. Hamdan (2020) reveals that independence of
AC has positive association with earnings quality in GCC
industrial firms. On the other hand, Fodio et al. (2013)
found that AC independence has a positive association with
EM. Moreover, Xie et al. (2003) revealed that AC
independence is not significantly associated with
constraining levels of EM. Kusnadi, et al., (2016)) did not
find any evidence that the independence of AC enhances
EM, as most of its members are already independent.
Similar study conducted by Chariri and Januarti (2017) who
found no evidence to support such association. According
to the above argument the mainstream of literature
supported the crucial role of AC independence in
decreasing the EM, and this study will go with the literature
and formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a negative significant association between
audit committee independence (ACINDE) and earnings
management (EM).

3.3 Audit Committee Financial Expertise
The expertise of AC members in accounting and finance
can restrict engaging in undesired actions such as EM
practices. The AC members with greater experience can
easily discover any improper practices than members with
less experience (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Tanyi & Smith,
2015). Members with financial and accounting expertise are
expected to weaken the managers’ ability to manipulate
earnings which support the financial statement credibility.
At the same time, the corporate governance codes, and
stock markets regulations in GCC countries require that AC
to include at least one member with financial experience.
Most of prior studies provided evidence that AC financial
expertise has negative association with EM. Bedard et al.
(2004) reported that the existence of at least one member on
the AC with financial background is negatively associated
with the level of EM. Similarly in Egypt, Soliman and
Ragab (2014) found that experience of AC members has a
major negative relationship with EM. Likewise, Xie et al.,
(2003) argues that an AC including at least one member
with financial knowledge is associated with lower level of
EM. Some studies provided evidence that AC financial
expertise reduce EM (Alzoubi E., 2019; Badolato et al.,
2014). Some other studies reported positive association
between financial expertise of AC and FRQ measured by
the lack of EM practices (Chariri & Januarti, 2017;
Hamdan, 2020; Hasan et al., 2020; Mohammad & Ahmed,
2017; Umobong & Ibanichuka, 2017). On the other hand,
© 2022 NSP
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few studies provided contradictory evidence, Rainsbury et
al. (2009) reported that AC financial expertise has
insignificant association with EM while, Carrera et al.
(2017) found positive association with EM. Reviewing the
literature shows that most studies support the negative
association between AC financial expertise and EM, and
this study will follow the literature and formulate the
following hypothesis:

The study sample includes 150 companies listed on the
stock markets of six GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain) during
the period from 2017-2020 that represents 532 firm-year
observations. Companies that are included in the sample
must have sufficient data regarding the AC characteristics
and annual reports. Banks and insurance companies were
excluded because of having specific industry characteristics
and different regulations.

H3: There is a negative significant association between
audit committee financial expertise (ACEXPE) and
earnings management (EM).

The data needed were collected from several sources such
as the stock markets of GCC countries, companies web
sites, companies’ annual reports, and other web sites such
as Mubashir and Tadawul. The reason behind selecting the
years 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 is the availability of data,
especially data regarding the details of AC attributes.

3.4 Audit Committee Meetings:
An effective AC meets regularly to provide sufficient time
for its members to carry out their tasks which improve the
process of financial reporting (Lin & Hwang, 2010). Greco
(2011) stated that more meetings of AC help members to
express their judgment about the company’s accounting
choices. In the same line the corporate governance codes
and the stock markets regulations in GCC countries require
AC to meet at least four times each year. Most of prior
research provides consistent evidence regarding the
association between AC and EM. Saleh et al., (2007) found
that companies which held more audit committee meetings
has reduced levels of earnings management practice.
Abbott et al., (2000) demonstrated a negative association
between meeting frequently and the manipulation of
financial reporting. Also, Xie et al. (2003), Soliman and
Ragab (2014), Lin and Hwang (2010), Abdul Rahman and
Ali (2006) found a negative correlation between audit
committee meetings and earnings management practices.
Habbash and Alagla (2015) reported negative association
between frequent meetings discretionary accruals. On the
other hand, Lin et al., 2006; Bamahros & Bhasin, 2016)
found no significant association between number of
meetings and lower levels of EM. Reviewing the literature
ensure that the mainstream of studies support the negative
association between AC number of meetings and EM.
Based on the above judgement in the literature, the
following hypothesis could be formulated:
H4: There is a negative significant association between
audit committee frequent meetings (ACMEET) and
earnings management (EM).

Table (1) below provides the number of firm-year
observations in each year totaling of 150 firm-year
observations after excluding 15 companies which provide
non-sufficient data.
Table 1: Firm-year observations over the period of
empirical investigation:
No. / Years

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

- No. of
companies
in GCC
countries

150

150

150

150

600

Companies
excluded

17

17

17

17

60

- Firm-year
Observatio
ns

133

133

133

133

532

4.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable (Earnings
Management)
The most widely used method to measure EM in the
accounting literature is the Jones (1991) model which was
modified by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). The
absolute value of discretionary accruals was estimated
using this modified model. Under this model:
Total accruals (TACCit) of firm i in the year t are
calculated by deducting the cash flows from operations
(CFO) from operating earnings as follows:

4 Research Methodologies

TACCit

4.1 The Sample Size and Data Collection

Additionally, total accruals were regressed against its
components and the error term. The formula used is as
follows:

© 2022 NSP
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TACCit / TASSit-1 = a (1 / TASSit-1) + b (∆REV - ∆REC) /
TASSit-1
+
c
(PPE
/
TASSit-1)
+
eit
(2)
Where:
TACCit
= total accruals in year t for firm i;
TASSit-1
= lagged total assets;
∆REVit
= revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1
for firm i;
∆RECit
= receivables in year t less receivables in year
t-1 for firm i;
PPEit
= gross property, plant, and equipment in year
t for firm i;
eit
= error term in year t for firm i;
In the above model, we followed Kothari, et al. (2005) in
using assets as the deflator to mitigate heteroscedasticity in
residuals. The discretionary accrual (DACC) can be
calculated by using the fitted values of regression
coefficients to measure non-discretionary accrual (NACC).
To estimate companies’ discretionary accrual, the nondiscretionary accrual is deducted from total accrual using
the following equation:
DACCit
(3)

=

TACCit

-

NACCit

4.3 The Research Models
This study investigates the association between AC
characteristics, and EM. To measure the association
between the independent variables ACSIZE, ACINDE,
ACEXPE, and ACMEET and the dependent variable
DACC as proxy for EM, the following model was
formulated:
DACCi,t = a0 i,t +a1 ACSIZE i,t + a2 ACINDE i,t +a3
ACEXPE i,t + a4 ACMEET i,t + ei,t
Whereas:
DACCi,t
= a measurement of financial reporting
quality score for company i, year t.”.
ACSIZE i,t
= number of AC members”.
ACINDE i,t
= the independence of AC members for
company i, t.”.
ACEXPE i,t
= the financial expertise of AC members for
company i, year t.”.
ACMEET i,t = the AC number of meetings for company i,
year t.”
ei,t
= the error term.
By adding the corporate governance and company
characteristics as control variables to the model, it will be
formulated as following:
DACCi,t = a0 i,t +a1 ACSIZE i,t + a2 ACINDE i,t +a3
ACEXPE i,t + a4 ACMEET i,t +a5 AUDQUL i,t + a6 BSIZEi,t
+ a7 BSHARi,t + a8 BINDEi,t + a9 FSIZE i,t + a10 FROE i,t
+a11 FLEV i,t + ei,t
Whereas:
AUDQUL i,t = the audit quality
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BSIZE i,t = the board of director size
BSHAR i,t
= the board of director shares
BINDE i,t
= the board of director independence
FSIZE i,t
= the company size.
FROE i,t
= the company return on equity.
FLEV i,t
= the company leverage”.

4.4 Variables
This study comprises three types of variables. The first type
is DACC (EM) as dependent variable, while the second
type is the independent variables including AC size
(ACSIZE), AC independence (ACINDE), AC financial
experience (ACEXPE), and AC frequent meetings
(ACMEET). The third type contains control variables
related to the corporate governance and company
characteristics including audit quality (AUDQUL), board
size (BOSIZE), board shares (BSHAR), board
independence (BINDE) firm size (FSIZE), firm
performance (FROE), firm leverage (FLEV). Table 2 below
summarizes all variables used in the study model and their
related proxies.
Table 2: Definitions of variables used in the empirical
analysis:
Variables

Pred.
Sign

Definitions

+ or -

1- number of AC
members.

2- AC independence
(ACINDE).

-

2- % of non-executive
members to total of
members.

3- AC financial and
accounting experience
(ACEXPE).

-

3- % of AC members
with
financial
experience to total of
members.

4- AC number of
meetings each year
(ACMEET).

-

4- Number of AC
meetings each year.

Control Variables:
1Audit
quality
(AUDQUL).

-

1- (1) if audit external
auditor is one of the
big
4
and
(0)
otherwise”.

2- Board Size (BSIZE)

-

2- Number of the
board of directors.

+ or -

3- % of shares owned

Dependent Variables:
DACC (EM)
Independent
variables:
1- AC size (ACSIZE).

3-

Board

Shares

© 2022 NSP
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(BSHAR)

by board members.

4- Board Independence
(BINDE)
5Company
(FSIZE)

-

4- % of external
members to total
board members.

size

+ or -

5- The total assets
natural logarithm.

6Company
performance (FROE)

+ or -

6- Company net profit
to total equity”.

7- Company leverage
(FLEV)

+ or -

7- Company total
liabilities/total assets.

Notes: Predicted signs of independent and control variable
were based on their expected effects on EM.

5 Findings and Discussion
This section comprises three sub-sections including,
descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, and multivariate
analysis.

5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 below shows the mean, minimum, maximum, and
standard deviation of the dependent variable, four
independent variables and seven control variables. The
average of EM for companies listed on the
GCC countries stock markets are about 32% upward, while
the maximum is 151% and the minimum is 84% downward
of their earnings. The average number of members for AC
size (ACSIZE) is about 4.5 with minimum of 3 and
maximum of 7 members. The average level of AC
independence (ACINDE) is about 64% with minimum of
33% and maximum of 100%. Regarding the AC financial
and accounting expertise (ACEXPE), the average level is
about 49% with minimum of 33% and maximum of 100%.
AC frequent meetings (ACMEET) are averaged about 7
meetings each year with minimum of 4 and maximum of
14. The results related to AC characteristics are mostly
consistent with the codes of corporate governance and the
regulations of stock markets in the GCC countries, as the
minimum of AC size is not less than 3, members should be
independent, at least one of them has financial expertise,
and they meet at least 4 times a year. Only the
independence level needs to be improved, as some AC
members are executive. Regarding the audit quality
measured by the size of external auditor, about 71% of
listed companies in the GCC countries stock market hire
one of the big four audit firms, while the remaining 29%
hire auditor not from the big four, which indicates the
quality of external auditing. Some more information
regarding the average, maximum, minimum, and standard
deviation of FSIZE, FROE, FLEV, are shown in table 3
below.
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Table 3 : Descriptive statistics all variables.
Variable
s
DACC
(EM)
ACSIZE
(No.)
ACIND
E (%)
ACEXP
E (%)
ACMEE
T (No.)
AUDQU
L (No.)
BSIZE
(No.)
BSHAR
(%)
BINDE
(%)
FSIZE
$1,000
FROE
(%)
FLEV
(%)

No.

Min.

Max.

Mean

133

1.112

0.143

133

0.441
3

Std.
Dev.
0.384

7

4.50

2.5

133

0.33

1

0.276

133

0.33

1

0.642
7
0.489

133

4

15

8.390

4.175

133

-

-

0.68

0.462

133

5

12

8.078

3.076

133

0.0

0.76

.2818

0.1657

133

0.18

1

.6085

0.264

133

7132

133

-122

1298179
5
179

122362
1
34.954

133

0.08

88.02

7102
84
27.84
5
35.86
3

0.388

22.754

5.2 Univarate Analysis
This section presents the relationship between each variable
and all other variables. Pearson correlation coefficients are
presented in table 4 below which shows some the
correlations between all variables. For instance, a negative
and significant correlation was found at P<0.01 between
EM and one independent variable namely, AC financial
experience (ACEXPE). Moreover, the relationship between
EM and AC independence (ACINDE) and AC meeting
(ACMEET) is negative and significant at P<0.05, while the
relationship with AC size (ACSIZE) is negative but not
significant. These results suggest that the most effective
attributes of AC on EM are the financial and accounting
expertise 99% level of confidence, and both AC
independence and AC meeting (AUMEET) at 95% level of
confidence. Moreover, a negative and significant
correlation was found at P<0.01 between EM and one
control variable namely, audit quality (AUDQUL), while
the board of director size (BSIZE) and the board of director
independence were negatively correlated with EM at
P<0.10.
On the other hand, the relationship between EM two control
variables related to the company characteristics namely the
company size (FSIZE) and company leverage (FLEV) is
positive and significant at P<0.10.
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Tables 4: Person Correlation Matrix.
DA
CC/
EM

ACSIZ
E

ACIN
DE

ACE
XPE

ACME
ET

AUDQ
UL

BRSH
AR

BIND
E

FSI
ZE

FR
OE

FLE
V

BSIZ
E
DACC/
EM

1

ACSIZE

-.164

1

ACIND
E

.452*

.115

1

.219*

.248*

1

.109

.187

.187

1

.141

-.087

-.029

.109

1

*

ACEXP
E

.672*
**

ACMEE
T

.412*
*

AUDQU
L

.685*
**

BSIZE

.374*

.432**

.059

.128

.127

.312**

1

BRSHA
R

.081

.174

.183

.166

.113

.145

-.018

1

BINDE

.261*

-.106

.360*

.111

.040

-.087

.037

-.043

1

FSIZE

.296*

.540**

-.034

.176

.293*

.283*

.645**

.156

.087

1

*

FROE

.158

.142

.257

.153

.178

.174

.311*

.219

.100

.067

1

FLEV

.276*

.149

-.084

.063

-.142

.092

.058

.090

-.150

.173

.268

1

*

*** Correlation is significant at P<0.01 (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at P<0.01 (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at P<0.01 (2-tailed).
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On the other hand, the relationship between EM two control
variables related to the company characteristics namely the
company size (FSIZE) and company leverage (FLEV) is
positive and significant at P<0.10.

variables four of them are related to corporate governance
mechanism and three of them are related to the corporate
characteristics named FSIZE, FROE, and FLEV. These
variables are explained in the methodology section.

Table 5: Multiple regression analysis for factors associated
with EM.

Table 5 above shows the explanatory power of the study
model measured by adjusted R2. The value of adjusted R2 in
the model is 54% which ranked this model as powerful one
comparing to the similar studies. For instance, Saleh et al.
(2007) reported at 22.3%, while Mohammad and Ahmed
(2017) reported adjusted R2 of 77.09%, and more recent
study conducted by Alzoubi E., (2019) reported 52.8%
adjusted R2. In a study conducted in the GCC countries,
Hamdan (2020) reported adjusted R2 38.5%. Comparing
our study model with the other modules reveals that this
model is one of the strongest models, as included all related
dependent and control variables. Moreover, the model in
general is significant at p<0.01, as F. Sig. valued 0.000
which indicates that the EM is explained by AC
characteristics and some other control variables, as they
shown in table 5 below. The explanatory power of each one
of the independent and control variables is shown in table 5
below in details.
According to table 5 above, ACSIZE has negative and nonsignificant association with EM. This result indicates that
larger number of AC does not affect the EM practice. This
result provides reasonable explanation for the requirements
of corporate governance codes and stock markets
regulations in the GCC countries which determined such
number to be at least three.

Predictors

B

Beta

T

ACSIZE

0.197
0.301
0.413
0.287
0.424
0.067
0.087
0.021

1.019
3.106
6.878
3.166
7.547
0.329
0.398

BSHAR

0.105
0.098
1.119
0.093
1.145
1.008
0.976
0.102

FSIZE

1.198

ROE
FLEV

ACINDE
ACEXPE
ACMEET
AUDQUL
BSIZE
BINDE

Sig.
T
0.271

Effect
NS

0.031

**

0.002

***

0.039

**

0.000

***

0.074

*

0.069

*

0.149

0.221

NS

0.066

0.422

0.084

*

0.203

0.017

0.114

0.354

NS

0.124

0.084

0.394

0.074

*

Constant

9.765

R2

0.692

Adj. R2

0.596

F

16.223

F Sig.

0.000***

*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.01.

5.3 Multivariate Analysis (Regression Analysis
and Hypotheses Testing)
This section is devoted to regression analysis and
hypotheses testing. Table 5 below presents the regression
model results that used to identify which of the independent
and control variables included in the regression model
contribute to the prediction of the dependent variable. The
regression model utilized to test the study hypotheses. This
model includes EM as dependent variable and four
independent variables named ACSIZE, ACINDE,
ACEXPE, and ACMEET. Also, it includes seven control
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This result confirms that the bigger size of AC, does not
affect EM, so, null hypothesis cannot be rejected the as
“There is no negative significant association between audit
committee size (ACSIZE) and earnings management (EM)”
and the alternative hypothesis will be rejected that “There
is a negative significant association between audit
committee size (ACSIZE) and earnings management
(EM)”.
Our results are consistent with numerous studies in the
literature on this regard (Klein, 2002; Yang & Krishnan,
2005; Setiany et al., 2017), as these studies reported
positive significant association ACSIZE and EM. In
contrast, this study is not consistent with some other studies
which reported insignificant association between ACSIZE
and EM (Xie et al., 2003; Siregar and Utama, 2008;
Metawee, 2013). The nonconsistency of some studies can
be explained by several reasons, as these studies conducted
in different contexts, dissimilar sample sizes, using various
proxies for measuring EM.
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Regarding the association between ACINDE and EM, the
multiple regression analysis in table 5 above presents
negative and significant association at p<0.05 as the value
of Seg. T is 0.031. This result indicates that the EM is
lower at companies having more independence AC, as such
independence provides members with more power and
autonomy to express their opinion, which will be reflected
on the financial reporting transparency and reduced
information asymmetry. This result ensures that EM will be
declined if the AC possess more independence. Hence, the
null hypothesis will be rejected as “There is a no negative
significant association between audit committee
independence (ACINDE) and earnings management (EM)”
and accept the alternative hypothesis that “There is a
negative significant association between audit committee
independence (ACINDE) and earnings management (EM)”.
Several studies in the literature are consistent with our
study on this regard, as the mainstream of empirical studies
reported negative and significant association between
ACINDE and EM. Soliman and Ragab (2014) provide
evidence that EM is negatively associated with ACINDE.
Hamdan (2020) reveals that the quality of earnings has
positive and significant association with more ACINDE.
Conversely, this study is not consistent with other few
studies (Xie et al., 2003; Fodio et al., 2013) who do not find
evidence that ACINDE improves EM practice or found
positive association.
The association between ACEXPE and EM is shown in the
multiple regression analysis in table 5 which presents
negative and significant association at p<0.01 as the value
of Seg. T is 0.002. This result indicates that EM is lower at
companies having more members with financial and
accounting expertise, as such expertise helps members to
detect inappropriate accounting and auditing practices and
restricts managers from practicing EM.
This result ensures that EM will be improved if members of
AC possess more experience in finance and accounting.
Hence, the null hypothesis will be rejected as “There is no
negative significant association between audit committee
financial expertise (ACEXPE) and earnings management
(EM)” and the alternative hypothesis will be accepted as:
“There is a negative significant association between audit
committee financial expertise (ACEXPE) and earnings
management (EM)”.
Our findings are consistent with the mainstream of prior
research that reported significant and negative association
between ACEXPE and EM. (Alzoubi Ebraheem Saleem,
2019; Badolato et al., 2014). Our study is not consistent
with few studies, Rainsbury et al. (2009) reported
insignificant association between the ACEXPE and EM,
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while Carrera et al. (2017) indicate that financial
accounting expertise increases EM. The explanation of this
contradictory results is that studies were conducted before
issuing any regulations or rules for AC.
The association between EM and AC frequent meetings
(ACMEET) is shown in the multiple regression analysis in
table 5 above which presents negative and significant
association at p<0.05 as the value of Seg. T is 0.039. This
result indicates that EM is lower at companies having
active AC members, as such activity provides members
with sufficient time to perform their obligations.
This result ensures that EM will be enhanced if the AC
meets frequently. Hence, the null hypothesis will be
rejected as “There is no significant association between
audit committee frequent meetings (ACMEET) and
earnings management (EM)” and the alternative hypothesis
will be accepted as: “There is a negative significant
association between audit committee frequent meetings
(ACMEET) and earnings management (EM)”.
Our findings are consistent with literature as most studies
reported negative significant association between
ACMEET and EM (Hamdan, 2020; Hasan et al., 2020; Lin
et al., 2006). Our results confirmed the findings of previous
studies as more AC meetings is negatively affected EM.
Our study in not consistent with some studies as they
reported insignificant association (Bamahros & Bhasin,
2016; Yang & Krishnan, 2005). These inconsistent results
could be due to to using old data, and the absence of
regulations for AC at that time.
Moreover, table 5 above shows negative association
between EM and some other control variables. For instance,
audit quality (AUDQUL) presents negative and significant
association at p<0.01 as the value of Seg. T is 0.000. This
finding reveals that EM is lower at companies hiring one of
the big four auditors, as they are more competent and more
independent than non-big four auditors. The board of
director size (BSIZE) and Board of director independent
(BINDE) have negative significant association with EM at
p<0.10. While the company size (FSIZE) and the company
leverage (FLEV) have positive and significant association
with EM at p<0.10. This result suggests that the bigger size
companies and bigger leverage provide higher level of EM.
In summary our results indicate that EM has negative and
significant association with three characteristics of AC
namely AC independence (ACINDE), AC financial
expertise (ACEXPE), and AC frequent meetings
(ACMEET), and negative non-significant association with
AC size (ACSIZE) thus, three null hypotheses are rejected,
and the three alternative hypotheses are accepted.
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6 Conclusions
This current study examines the association between audit
committee AC characteristics and earnings management
(EM) of companies listed on the GCC countries’ stock
markets. The research data was collected from a sample of
133 companies from six GCC countries during the period
from 2017-2020 making 532 firm-year observations. Four
hypotheses were tested, EM as dependent variable was
regressed with four independent variables represent AC
size (ACSIZE), AC independence (ACINDE), AC
experience (ACEXP), and AC frequent meetings
(ACMEET). Seven appropriate control variables were
added to the study model, four of them related to corporate
governance mechanism and three of the related to the
company characteristics. The author adopted the modified
Jones’ model for estimating EM.
The study findings reveal that the level of EM on the study
sample averaged 14.3% upward while the minimum and the
maximum valued 44.1% downward % and 111.2% upward
respectively. The average of AC size is about 4.5 members
with minimum of 3 and maximum of 7 members. The
average of AC independence is about 64.3% with minimum
of 33% and maximum of 100%. Regarding the AC
financial and accounting expertise, the average is about
49% with minimum of 33% and maximum of 100%. AC
meetings are averaged about 7.4 meetings each year with
minimum of 4 and maximum of 15. The results related to
AC characteristics are mostly consistent with the codes of
corporate governance and the regulations of stock markets
in the GCC countries, as the minimum of AC size not less
than 3, members should be independent, at least one of
them has financial expertise, and they meet at least 4 times
a year. About 68% of listed companies in the GCC
countries stock market hire one of the big four audit firms,
which indicates the quality of external auditing. The results
indicate that EM is negatively and significantly associated
with three of AC characteristics so, three null hypotheses
are rejected, and the three alternative hypotheses are
accepted. Moreover, the results indicate that EM is not
significantly associated with AC size. There are some
limitations of the current study. First, results are limited to
the GCC context and could be re-conducted on other
emerging markets. Second, some more characteristics of
the audit committee such as its member shareholding, the
male or female member. The findings of this study have
wide implications to all stakeholders and stock markets for
the role of AC characteristics as internal corporate
governance mechanism on restricting EM practices.
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